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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
RICHARD B. FAULKNER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
11539 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Richard B. Faulkner, appeals 
from a conviction in the Second District Court, 
Weber County, State of Utah, of the crime of burg-
lary in the third degree. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged by information with 
the crime of burglary in the third degree. The mat-
ter was heard on November 26, 1968, before the 
Honorable John F. Wahlquist, Judge, sitting in the 
Second District Court at Ogden, Utah, with a jury. 
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The appellant was found guilty. Sentence was im-
posed December 10, 1968, confining the appellant 
in the Utah Sta.te Prison for a term as provided by 
law of not less than six months and not more than 
three years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondents prays that the judgment of 
the trial Court be arnrmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent, State of Utah, submits the fol-
lowing statement of facts as being more in keeping 
with the rule that evidence will be reviewed on ap-
peal in a light most favorable to the trial court'.s de-
termination. 
At approximately l :00 p.m. on the afternoon of 
July 31, 1968, John C. Wood, one of the State's wit-
nesses, was proceeding up the steps to the second 
floor of the Kiesel Building in Ogden, Utah, when he 
heard a buzzer sound coming from the lunchroom 
(T. 25 & 26). He started toward the lunchroom when 
he observed two men coming out of the lunchroom 
(T. 28). They passed by him and started down the 
stairs. Mr. Wood identified defendant Faulkner as 
one of the men coming from the lunchroom (T. 30). 
Earl Lindquist, a State's witness, also testified 
that at approximately ] :00 on July 31, 1968, he heard 
the sound of the alarm buzzer which he had installed 
in the coke me.chine in the lunchroom (T. 36). The 
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alarm was set to go off when the door was opened. 
The door could only be opened by a key (T. 38). He 
asked his helper to hold the elevator while he went 
up the stairs to investigate. As he proceeded up the 
stairs, he met two men coming down the stairs. He 
asked them to wait until he could check his machine. 
They pushed by him and continued down the stairs 
at a fast walk. He asked three engineers to follow 
them until he was able to get a policeman (T. 40). 
He observed that one of the men was carrying a 
bank bag (T. 41). The bank bag was picked up later 
and the contents included a number of keys, one 
of which was found to open the pop machine in the 
lunchroom (T. 68). There was no money taken from 
the pop machine (T. 63). 
The appellant testified that he opened the ma-
chine with the intent of robbing it (T. 75 & 76). He 
also admitted that the State's witnesses had testified 
as to happenings and sequences of events which 
occurred after he left the lunchroom (T. 76). His testi-
mony was that the intent to commit larceny was not 
formed until he was already in the lunchroom (T. 
75), that he had come to the building seeking to 
change his parole from Salt Lake City to Ogden (T. 
73), and that he entered the lunchroom only because 
his companion, Mr. Jooston, had called to him 
(T. 74). He then entered the lunchroom where the 
coke machine was located, whereupon the crime for 
which the defendant-appellant was charged and 
convicted was committed. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HEARD THE MO-
TION TO SEVER, AND IN ITS DISCRETION DENIED 
SUCH MOTION. SUCH DENIAL WAS NOT ERRON-
EOUS, AND EVEN IF IT WERE, IT DID NOT AFFECT 
THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT, MR. 
FAULKNER. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-6 (1953) provides: 
"When two or more defendants are jointly 
charged with any offense, whether felony or mis-
demeanor, they shall be tried jointly, unless the 
court in its discretion on the motion of the prose-
cuting attorney or any defendant orders separate 
trials." 
A motion to sever was presented and argued 
by counsel for the defendant-appellant. The trial 
court, pursuant to its discretionary authority, denied 
the motion. The Utah Supreme Court held in State v. 
Miller, 111 Utah 255, 177 P.2d 727 (1947) that: 
"Since the appellant could not demand a 
severance as a matter of rights it must appear that 
the court had before it the facts which would 
indicate that the appellant would be unduly 
prejudiced by a joint trial before it could be 
said that the trial court had abused its discre-
tion." (Emphasis added.) 111 Utah at 258. 
While the record shows that counsel for the 
appellant made a motion for separate trials, it also 
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shows that counsel did not set forth facts, either by 
affadavit or oral argument, which established 
prejudice against the appellant. Thus, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's 
motion to sever. 
The Utah Supreme Court also held in State v. 
Rivenburgh, 11 U.2d 95, 355 P.2d 689 (1960), that the 
trial court had not abused its discretion in denying 
a motion to sever even though the defense of the 
defendants were different. The fact still remained, 
they participated in a joint unlawful act, their de-
fenses were not inconsistent or antagonistic to each 
other and there was no prejudicial fact establishing 
a need to sever the defendants for trial. 11 U.2d at 
108-110. In the instant case, as in Rivenburgh, there is 
no allegation of inconsistent or antagonistic defenses 
as between the defendants, nor is there any other fac-
tual allegation establishing a need for severance at 
trial. The motion merely alleges that the abundance 
of evidence against one defendant was greater than 
against the other. This standing alone cannot be 
deemed sufficiently substantial to rule that the trial 
court erred in denying the appellant's motion to 
sever. 
Even if the denial of the motion to sever were 
error, it did not prejudice the rights of the appellant. 
The appellant admitted during the trial court pro-
ceedings that he was at the scene of the crime and 
that he participated in the unlawful act charged 
against him (T. 75-76). To gain a reversal on appeal, 
the appellant must show error that is so prejudicial 
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that there is at 1'3ast a fair likelihood that the result 
would have been different had the error not been 
committed. Startin 1·. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 636, 237 
P.2d 834, 836 (1951): Gordon v. Prom City, 15 U.2d 287, 
290, 391 P.2d 430, 433 (1964); State i·. Valdez, 19 U.2d 
426, 429, 432 P.2d 53, 55, ( 1967); see also Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953). Jn view of the appellant's testi-
mony cited above, he has clearly failed to show that 
the error he now alleges would in all likelihood 
have caused a different result had the alleged error 
not have been committed. 
A. THE ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY OF THE 
STATE'S WITNESS .Ll\S TO WHAT ONE DEFEND-
ANT, MR. JOOSTON, SAID, WAS NOT PREJUDI-
CIAL ERROR AGAINST THE OTHER DEFENDANT, 
MR. FAULKNER, AND EVEN IF IT WERE ERRON-
EOUS, IT DID NOT AFFECT THE SUBSTANTIAL 
RIGHTS OF THE APPELLANT, MR. FAULKNER. 
The appellant is alleging that the admission of 
the testimony by State's witness Earl Lindquist was 
hearsay and prejudicial against defendant, Mr. 
Faulkner. Co-defendant Mr. Jooston, admitted to 
being on the stairway with Mr. Lindquist. The de-
fense counsel objected on the basis that the testimony 
was hearsay as tc defendant Faulkner. The judge 
then said he would receive the testimony only as to 
the person who speaks and not to the other; that 
the other man's case (Mr. Faulkner) would be judged 
as though this were not a part of the evidence (T. 46). 
This admission of evidence was not prejudicial, 
nor was it hearsay, because the testimony did not 
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even mention Mr. faulkner. The Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-44-6 (1953), is cited as support for appellant's 
position, but this statute speaks only in terms of one 
defendant testifying for or against another defend-
ant. Such is not the circumstance in the instant case. 
POINT II 
THE INFORMATION ADEQUATELY DEFINED 
AND GA VE NOTICE OF THE CRIME CHARGED, AND 
NO ERROR OCCURRED WHEN THE COURT CLARl-
F IED THE INFORMATION IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO 
THE JURY. 
The information charged the defendants with 
"Burglary in the third degree committed as follows, 
to-wit: that said defendant broke and entered the 
Kiesel Building, in the day time with intent to commit 
larceny therein." 
The Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-5 (1953) defines third 
degree burglary as follows: 
"Every person who, in the daytime enters 
any dwelling house, ronm, apartment, tenement, 
shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse 
or other building, or any tent, vessel water craft, 
railroad car, automobile, automobile trailer, areo-
plane or aircraft, with intent to steal or to com-
mit :my felony whatever therein, is guilty of 
burglary in the third degree." (Emphasis added.) 
The defendant alleges surprise when the trial 
court in instruction six instructed the jury that a per-
son entering the lunchroom with intent to commit 
larceny is third degree burglary. The defendant al-
leaes that said instruction defines a crime different 
:; 
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than that defined in the information charging the 
defendant with breaking and entering the Kiesel 
Building in the daytime with intent to commit 
larceny therein (Emphasis added). The definition of 
third degree burglary includes both the building 
and any room within the building which was closed 
to the defendant. The Kiesel Building was open to 
the public during the daytime on July 31, 1968, the 
day of the crime. On the other hand, the lunchroom, 
which was located on the second floor of said build-
ing, was closed to the public and the defendant. 
The lunchroom was the only area entered as evi-
dence which could possibly support a conviction 
of third degree burglary. The thrust of the State's 
case centered around the lunchroom. Clearly the 
defendant was appraised of the crime for which he 
was charged from the very beginning of the pro-
ceedings. 
The Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-S(i)(b) (1953) states 
that the information is valid and sufficient if it charges 
the offense for which the defendant is being prose-
cuted in sufficient terms to give the court and the 
defendant notice of what offense is intended to be 
charged. Morover, Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-43(2) 
(1953) states that: 
"No variance between those allegations of 
an information, indictment or bill of particulars 
which state the particulars of the offense 
whether amended or not, and the evidence of-
fered in support thereof shall be ground for the 
acquittal of the defendant. The court may at 
any time cause the information, indictment or 
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bill of particulars to be amended in respect to any 
such variance, to conform to the evidence. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In light of the above statute, clearly the trial court 
acted properly in allowing instruction six which in 
effect amended the information causing it to conform 
to the evidence; i.e., defining the area entered as the 
Kiesel Building lunchroom rather than just the 
Kielsel Building. 
In State v. Colston, 16 U.2d 89, 91, 396 P.2d 405, 
407, (1964), the Utah Supreme Court held that a 
discrepancy in the information would not be fatally 
defective where language fully appraised the de-
fendant of the precise charge against him by detail-
ing the facts constituting the offense. Such is the 
situation in the instant case. 
The defendant also challenges the last sentence 
of instruction six, which is as follows: 
"By an intent to commit burglary the court 
means a person entered an area closed to him with 
an intent to steal ... However, it would be 
burglary if the defendant enters a room with an 
intent to look and see if there is something that 
can be stolen." 
This sentence was merely an attempt by the court 
to explain to the jury in layman's terms that the 
would-be thief need not have a specific item in mind 
to steal. Rather, he need only have an intent to steal. 
People v. Canon, 130 Cal.App.2d 75, 278 P.2d 475 (1955); 
State v. Pearre, 237 Md. 622, 206 A.2d 249 (1965). 
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Moreover, the jury is presumed to have consid-
ered the instruction as a whole, Cope z·. Damson, 30 
Cal.2d 193, 180 P.~d 873 (1947); Blaine z·. B)'ers, 91 Idaho 
665, 429 P.2d 397 (1967). The portion of instruction six 
which defendant objects to would be of no material 
consequence when all instructions are considered 
as a whole. In addition, reasonable minds, based 
on the overwhelming evidence against the defend-
ant, could only have arrived at the same verdict, to-
wi t: guilty. 
POINT III 
THE TESTIMONY OF THE DEFENDANT AND THE 
CIRCUMSANTIAl EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE ST A TE 
WERE SUFFICIENT FOR A JURY TO FIND BEYOND A 
REASONABIE DOUBT A VERDICT OF GUILTY 
AGAINST THE ACCUSED. 
In a criminal case where intent is to be de-
termined, the State is entitled to use circumstantial 
evidence as an inference of intent. People v. Franklin, 
153 Cal.App.2d 795, 314 P.2d 983 (1957). In the instant 
case. the State had to show that the defendant en-
tered the lunchroom intending to commit larcency. 
Intent, at time of entry to commit a felony, as a requi-
site element of burglary, is rarely susceptible of 
direct proof, and must usually be inferred from all 
facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence. 
People l'. He11derso11, 138 Cal.App.2d 505, 292 P.2d 267 
(1956). When did the intent to commit burglary form, 
two steps outside the lunchroom door. or two steps 
inside the lunchroom itself? A jury capably observed 
and heard testimony of the defendant and consid-
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ered the other evidence before it. That jury was 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the de-
fendant ha.cl the requisite intent and was thus guilty 
as charged. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts in the instant case amply demonstrate 
that the trial court acted properly in finding the ap-
pellant guilty of the crime charged. The legal claims 
of error on which the appellant relies for reversal 
are without merit. The motion to sever was properly 
heard and denied and appellant has shown no preju-
dicial error therefrom. The mere claim of prejudice 
is not sufficient, it must be shown. The information 
was adequate and gave notice to the appellant of 
the substantive e]ements of the charge. The instruc-
tions given by the court vvere consistent as to in-
tent of the defendant. The circumstantial evidence 
and the testimony of the defendant were sufficient 
to justify a reasonable inference that the requisite 
intent for third degree burglary existed, thus satisfy-
ing the elements of the crime. We therefore pray 
that this Court affirm the conviction of the appellant. 
Respectfully submitted 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant Attorney 
General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Resp<mdent 
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